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At every point in her novel-writing career, Eliot was to ponder the
connection between words and experience in the light of what we
might call her Logic of Mind. Eliot saw mind as an organic process and
this conception of mind provided her with a tlexible and scientific
model for consciousness and behaviour and served as a basis for the
enlightened realism of her novels. The best access we have to Eliot's
view of the Victorian science of mind is in the works of combined
psychology. physiology and philosophy written by the partner of her
literary years, George Henry Lewes. He treated language unde:r the
Comtean heading ofthc 'Logic of Signs' . Long before Lewes made his
laborious explanation of thc psychological workings of the 'Logic of
Signs' in his final work, Problems of LIfe {/nd Mind. Eliot hegan her
essay 'The Natural History of German Life' by writing in this way: 'It
is an interesting branch of psychological observation to note the
images that are hahitually associated with abstract or collectivc tcrms-
what may bc called the picture-writing of the mind. which it carries on
concurrently with the more subtle symbolism oflanguagc'.1 Here Eliot
approaches a psychologically based philosophy by describing the
Logic oflmages-'the picture-writing of the mind'-and the Logic of
Signs: 'the subtle symbolism of language'. Before shc began writing
fiction and before Lewes attempted to enunciate the functions of
languagc in the context of cerebral activity. Eliot tried to work ol;lt the
association between language and cerebral activity in a way that would
have meaning for her an. '
Eliot and Lewes were both concerned with discovering a progression
in mental development which would account for the existence of
conscience as something as inevitable and as exclusively human as art
or philosophy. Higher reason is a mental 'logic' which Eliot wishes to
find not only in statistical thinking but also in aesthetic appreciation
and cven in feeling. Lewes broke down the organisation of mind into
what he called a 'threefold division of logic'. beginning with thc Logic
of Feeling. progressing through the Logic of Images and ending in the
Logic of Signs. According to Lewes. the first stage. which entails 'the
Animal Logic' based on feeling 'is never critical, always intuitive'.
The Logic of Images involves the reprcsentation of primitive mental
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states which are immediately connected with sensations. lllis logic
must be further refined if it is to be articulated as mental signs, because
thought exists in relation to feeling in the same way that algebra exists
in relation to arithmetic. The Logic of Signs extends intuitive or
empirical knowledge into specialised realms of meaning, such as
higher mathematics and language: it is associated with what Lewes
calls 'the intellectual life, and is exclusively human'. He explains its
function in this way: 'unless a word is formed there is no idea; unless
the feeling takes articulate shape it remains a vague feeling and not an
idea'. Thought and feeling are made precise by being articulated in
signs.2
Eliot emphasises the importance of written language and
mathematics as providing the mastery of complex ideas that are
required for the development of higher feeling, ideas which are tools
for building communities. 'Systematic co-operation implies general
conceptions', she writes, 'and a provisional subordination of egoism
... which are as foreign to the mind of the peasant as logarithms or the
doctrine ofchemical proportions'.3And elsewhere: 'Amiable impulses
without intellect, man may have in common with dogs and horses; but
morality, which is specifically human. is dependent on the regulation
offecling by intellect'.4 The organisation of knowledge and experience
into mental signs represents a movement away from undifferentiated
particulars to general moral laws and knowledge based on the emotions.
lllis progress from a simple yet unorganised to a complicated yet
abstract state of mind involves naming as part of the process by which
rudimentary knowledge is transformed into moral understanding. As
twentieth century philosophers of science such as Richard Dawkins
recognise: 'mathematics ... doesn't only stretch the imagination. It
also disciplines and controls it'.5
Altruism for Eliot depends upon the command of higher thought,
and for her this includes both rational and non-rational types of
knowledge. Rationality must be tempered by non-rational forms of
inherited thought-patterns which depend on feeling, and language is
one such inherited thought -pattern. In a late notebook Eliot writes' Are
general ideas formed by animals? Not in our sense of concepts. Yet in
another sense all ideas and images are general. for they are not signs'.6
It is clear that to be human is to master signs and, equally. that to master
signs is to be human.
In Eliot's first novel Allam Belle we find the Logic of Signs at the
top of the novel's scale of values. The ability to understand signs gives
the thinker access to an exclusively human morality which is higher
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than those moral ideas shared with other animals. As the narrator in
Adam Bede says compassionately about three rustics whom the
schoolmaster is teaching to read: 'It was almost as if three rough
animals were making humble efforts to learn how they might become
human' (p.28l),7 The narrator endorses the schoolmaster's
encouragement of his rustic learners towards literacy and the fuller
humanity which accompanies it. By submitting themselves to the
discipline of acquiring the accoutrements of human civilisation, Eliot
suggests, individuals can accelerate beyond that development within a
natural selection that depends on chance.
The novel makes Adam both its hero and, at times, its spokesman
because of his skills in the Logic of Signs, especially mathematics.
Sally Shuttleworth has argued that 'Adam's social progress is
synonymous with his power of mathematical addition' and that. at the
same time, 'mathematical reasoning lends a rigidity to [his) social
judgements'.8 But Adam's grasp of the abstract reasoning required for
mathematics is both more homely and more sophisticated than is
suggested by Shuttleworth's idea of a straight-forward 'social progress' .
His 'acquaintance with mechanics and figures' which arc 'the secrets
of his handicraft' is 'made easy to him by the inborn inherited faculty'
(p.258). This inheritance includes 'the mechanical instinct, the keen
sensibility to harmony, the unconscious skill of the modelling hand'
(p.84). All higher thought and achievement work towards a cumulative
Logic of Signs which is independent of the individual. Lewes
acknowledges that 'the Moral Sense and intellectual progress; arc
ruled by the law of inheritance, and refers his readers to Herbert
Spencer's Principles oj Psychology.9 The notion that such skills arc
innate-a function of the development of a kind of General Mind-is
also expressed in Problems, where Lewes writes 'in the development
of Industry and the Mechanical Arts, the mind has acquired not only
new powers, but the equivalents of new senses'.10 An enduring,
inherited Logic ofSigns provides its possessor with instincts as various
as feeling, language, morals and technical skill.
Adam's skills have an everyday practicality. While he has 'not the
heart of getting rich' (p.259) and so climbing the ladder of social
progress, his sterling mental qualities are exempli tied both by his skill
in pure mathematics (beyond that knowledge of carpentry 'inhe~ited'
from his father and probably his grandfather before him), and his 'will'
to master it. Mathematics is privileged as at once the most abstract and
the highest form of knowledge: inductive reasoning. Adam's teacher
suggests he might have 'gone into the higher branches' of mathematics
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'ifhe hadn't had so much hard work to do' (p.463). Adam, however, is
contl-nt to play his part in the workaday world.
Ati.hough it would be unrealistic to expect that Adam, who lives
outside a tiny village, should have learnt either another science that did
not relate to his trade or one of the subjects such as Greek and Latin
which the pastor and Arthur have studied at university, his skill with
figures is a credible representation of his higher intellect and mastery
of the abstract reasoning required for moral judgement. Such skill is
not enough, however, to ensure a cultivated moral sense; Eliot makes
the point that Adam and Dinah also need to develop the cultivated
feeling that will issue in proper moral judgements. Intellectual pursuits
and morals are both subject to a gradation. At the same time, Eliot
warns against confusing rustic stupidity with moral innocence: 'It is
.quite true', she writes, 'that a thresher is likely to be innocent of any
adroit arithmetical cheating, but he is not the less likely to carry home
his master's corn in his shoes and pocket' .11 Adam's'adroit arithmetical'
proficiency does not corrupt him. of course, and Eliot makes
mathematical reasoning function as an inherited skill which is both
innate and cultivated and is connected with his capacity to make moral
judgements.
Dinah is the novel's other guide to higher reasoning and moral
judgement. In line with Methodist principles, she takes the words of
the Bible as signs to guide her feelings and words. These signs belong
to an inherited moral culture and are valued by the agnostic Eliot
because the Bible provides a set of moral signs which are beyond
temporality and so belong to the Logic of Signs. Feelings and her own
Logic of Signs compel Dinah to speak and act within the community.
Her sympathetic words allow others to reach their higher selves, which
they find within their own feelings and experience. For Eliot, Dinah's
language allows connection with inward life, a connection which is
realised in the prison scene. This scene-in which Dinah tries to save
the soul of her cousin Hetty. the story's fallen woman-enacts adrama
made from bare words, plain story telling, exhonation and confession.
The two cousi ns are lost ina darkness which serves as hackdrop to their
word-drama. Hetty's 'dark mind' is laid bare in the prison; of all the
hook's chapters, it is the one which contains Hetty's most sustained
speech without narrative interpretation. Hetty's is a 'lower nature' to
Dinah's higher one and as such is beyond reclaiming (p.206).
In the confession scene the force of the heroine's higher feeling,
rather than transforming Hetty, actually serves to lay bare the primitive
vixen in Hetty who subsequently makes way for the novel's perfect
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love matches between the characters who possess higher feeling. Hetty
is in fact superseded as the centre of the novel. According to Eliot's
social ethic, better feeling tlows like force to interconnect people; this
propels Hetty in the confession scene to overcome the egoism of her
primitive nature and sweeps away ablockage in her consciousness. At
the same time, however, her confession reveals her primitive and
untransformable psychology. Hetty shudders after making her
confession to Dinah 'as if there were still something behind'. What
remains hehind is her mind's crazed replaying of her hahy's cry and
her visualisation of the spot of countryside where she killed it. which is
the refrain of her broken confession (p.500).
Freud's concept of the 'repetition-compulsion'-of which Hetty's
hehaviour here could be seen as aversion-identifies such acompulsion
as an entirely natural force that is 'probably inherent in the very nature
of the instincts-a principle powerful enough to overrule the pleasure-
principle. lending to certain aspects of the mind their daemonic
character 'l2. In The Mill Ofl the Floss Eliot gives her own explanation
of how a crisis of this kind affects the primitive imagination: '~hen
uncultured minds, confined to a narrow range of personal experience,
are under the pressure of continued misfortune, their inward life is apt
to hecome a perpetually repeated round of sad and hitter thoughts ...
as if they were machines set to a recurrent series of movemen,s'. t3
Hetty's primitive ego stumhles over a psychological symbol of her
crisis and cannot move heyond it. Hetty's self-command and self-in-
time are equal1y arrested hy the preverbal protest of her child, which
she cannot bear as it is the symbol of her mistake and shame. There is
only a thin veneer of social behaviour covering the hestial in Eliot's
portraits of primitive women. When the primitive loses her, self-
command, the animal takes over.
Hetty's primitive ego limits her understanding of other people's
minds as systems of thought and feeling different from her own'. She
sees in others only aretlection of her own shallow fancies. Her ego acts
as a mirror, and when connected with Hetty, mirrors illustrate the
boundaries of her ego and its vision of reality. Early in the novel she
worships her retlection and begins to spin her fantasy of becoming a
great lady, a fantasy which is fed when Arthur Iirst courts her. She
returns to the mirror to read Arthur's letter breaking off their love
affair, when she sees her retlection as being 'almost like a companion
that she might complain to-that would pity her' (p.379). In this, her
first pain, Hetty's self-objectification begins to harden her spirit from
a luxurious carelessness to the potential of abandoning her child.
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Although Hetty docs not herself see her reOection as anyone other
than her own pathetic or admirable self, earlier in the novel Eliot
introduces the idea of the mirror's image as reOecting the self as a sign
of foregone generations. Hetty's beauty is charged with a 'national
language' of inherited 'meaning and pathos' (p.330). 'Family likeness
has often a deep sadness i: it. Nature, that great tragic dramatist. knits
us together by bone and muscle, and divides us by the subtler web of
our brains.' TIlis inherited language which is an innate part of the self,
becomes visible in the mirror, so that the 'long-lost mother' is seen 'in
the glass as our own wrinkles come' (p.84).
Just as Hetty's face mirrors the faces and the feelings of past
generations, so that face is symbolic of her brittle. shallow ego, the
physical 'sign' of a moral quality. Late in Hetty's wandering the
narrator dwells on 'the face which had smiled at itself in the old
speckled glass, or smiled at others when they glanced at it admiringly.'
The face is Hetty's inescapable existentialist ego: 'even her own
beauty was indifferent to her' (p.381). Hetty Ii ves so much in the eyes
of others that her beauty becomes depersonalised, referred to as if it
were something belonging to a lower animal: 'the face smiled at others
when they glanced at it'. Later in the same paragraph Eliot describes
the transformation Hetty's alienation has brought about in her tine
face: 'all love and belief in love departed from it-the sadder for its
beauty. like that wondrous Medusa-face, with the passionate, passionless
lips' (pA30). The Medusa is an imaginative relic ofsupernatural power
(that is, a scientifically disproven force) which has no place within
modern 'progressive' society, but as a creature whose face has potent
power, the Medusa has a continuing symbolic force in Hetty's history.
At an earlier point in the narrative, Hetty's suffering is represented
through the symbol of Christ's cross, found unexpectedly in the midst
of 'joyous nature'. The image of Hetty's pain as it is subsumed by
Christ's agony prepares for Adam's internalising of her pain and the
subsequent rebirth of his emotional life. arebirth which is described in
Christlike terms. Hetty's punishment by forces hidden within nature-
a reticent way of naming illegitimate or 'natural' childbirth-is
ultimately seen in terms of Adam'sChristlike sUITcring and redemption
and the symbol of that suffering which has been formerly associated
with Hetty is transformed to him. The symbol of Hetty's own suffering,
on the other hand. is the pagan Medusa.
In a way Hetty is herself becoming a work of art, a kind of
archetype. a 'sign'; in Adam Bede she is killed into art through Eliot
making her into the sign for a primitivity that must be transcended.
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Eliot inverts the myth of Medusa, in such a way as to imagine Hetty's
passions as reflected by her face turning her heart to stone. When
Hetty's face no longer attracts wondering admiration but rather seems
to the ohserver incongruous with her lonely air, ringless finger and
swollen helly, then her ego, shallow as it always was, cracks and she
loses her identity and even her sanity. Dorothy Van Ghent has described
Hetty's state as 'the chaos of animal fear, which, in the human being,
is insanity' .14 ills is dranlatically realised when, in custody for
infanticide and confronted with both names written in her pockethook,
Hetty refuses to admit to being either herself or Dinah.
Hetty's narrow and limited nature which refuses to expand and
accommodate the needs, desires and viewpoints of others is further
exemplified by her problems with language. As I have illustrated, her
bovine solipsism cannot comprehend the logic of signs used in verhal
expression. Hetty does not attain the logic of signs because that
requires a mental progression beyond the mental universe of the
isolated primitive ego. So when a cart driver jests to her 'He's preny
nigh six foot, I'll be bound, isna he, now?' Hetty is frightened and asks
'Who?' (pAI5). She expects the driver is asking about someone he
knows, and does not register that he is banteri ng about Hetty's possibl y
having an admirer. Hetty possesses a primitive mind continuous with
that which Lewes describes in Physiology of Common Life: 'it is
probable that the Bee and Crah have no power of forming ahstract
propositions. It is prohahle that they are unahle to carryon trains of
thought, remote from the senslItions H/hieh lire immediately {!!feeting
tilem , .15
According to Lewes, it is the power ofsymbolic expression and the
capacity to love which separates man from the animals. 16 Significantly,
Hetty lacks both these sophistications. The 'blank in Hetty's nature' is
her deficiency of feeling; the 'absence of any warm. self-devoting
love' (p.203). In the darkened prison cell. her cousin Dinah tries to
persuade Hetty to confess to murdering her newborn child. hy making
her aware of the presence of God. Dinah says rhetorically 'There is
some one else in this cell, some one close to you.' Hetty's frightened
reply-'Who?' (pA94)-shows she has no understanding ofsymholic
ideas and language.
Hetty's tendency to interpret words in terms of her own immediate
feeling is exempli lied at several points in her relation with Arthur, who
protests: 'He had said no word with the purpose of deceiving her, her
vision was spun by her own childish fancy ... half out of his, own
actions' (p.358). But Hetty does not respond 10 words so much ali to
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appearances, especially those which conform to her dream-visions.
Arthur rationalises his actions until they appear to him to be justifiable,
another irrational mental process which is opposed to the clear processes
of arithmetic. Arlhur and Hetty are each in their own dream-world,
operating according to their own irrational dream-systems which allow
disastrous choices to be cloaked as right ones and refuse the reality of
the Logic of Signs.
Adam insists that Arlhur write a note to Hetty breaking off their
relationship. But the words in Arlhur's note arouse in Hetty ablind and
passionate repugnance for their writer which is expressed in her
physical attitude to the letter itself 'which she snatched and crushed
and then opened again. that she might read it once more' to see 'if the
letter was really so cruel.' Her response to the letter is at each point a
predominantly physical one. Hetty sees Arlhur's note as somehow pan
of himself-'it had a faint scent of roses, which made her feel as if
Arlhur were close to her. She put it to her lips' (p.337)-and then as a
kind of substitute for Arthur. Hetty's pre-verbal understanding leads
her to figure the note as a subject active in its cruelty, and she turns her
feelings upon the page itself: 'she crushed it up again in anger'. Hetty
has taken her reading of their affair as proving her own projected logic
ofevents; when Arthur's letter demonstrates this logic is false she is no
closer to understanding the true logic ofevents and their consequences.
She is incapable of attaining the Logic of Signs.
Hetty recoils from the letter yet she stilllinds comfort in the idea of
its writer so that she decides to run away to Arlhur and abandon herself
to his mercy. Although Arthur suggests repeatedly in his letter that she
write to him if she should need his help. when she does require
assistance Hetty rejects the idea of writing to Arthur, going instead on
her long toilsome journey of hope and despair (pAll). Hetty is
propelled by primitive desires and fears which dominate her thoughts
and actions, leaving no room for the sophisticated concepts which
might lead to more intellectual activities: Hetty's self is defined and
expressed only in actions. As Lewes writes in a discussion of Darwin,
animals do not use symbols (such as words) because they have no
ideas: 'their instincts lead directly to actions, never to ideas. Hence,
while they share with man the sexual instinct, they know nothing of
love',17 Lewes also writes that animals lack folly, and the possession
of this attribute sets Hetty apart from animals, although it is in an
ignoble way. Hetty's folly is to eschew language and its associated
Logic of Signs, which she fears, preferring instead an irrational course
of action.
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At the beginning ofEliot 's novel-writing career Adam Bede explores
the dark edges of Hetty's consciousness, dark because she lacks the
moral and mental sophistication provided by the Logic of Signs.
Hetty's 'Animal Logic' is balanced by the logic of the Everyman
Adam. who uses .the Logic of Signs in the everyday world, and by the
logic of Dinah who understands the mysticism of the symbol and who
uses a language of higher feeling which deri ves from it. Eliot revisits
these concepts in her final novel Daniel Deronda where her realism
engages with the power of signs in characters possessing complex
sensibilities. and she explores the significance ofthc sign in relation to
the more sophisticated world of Jewish culture and scholarship.
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